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FRAUD AS A DEFENSE TO INSURANCE CONTRACTS
With the growing number of insurance policies being written each
year and the increasing collections by beneficiaries under such policies,
an interesting problem has grown in importance. The problem arises
under statutes requiring the insurer to attach a copy of the ap-
plication for insurance to the policy when issued. When the insurer
has not complied with the statute the question is presented as to
whether the application can nevertheless be used to prove the de-
fense of fraudulent procurement.
This problem arose in Virginia in the recent case of Southland
Life Ins. Co. v. Donatz,' and presented the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals with its first opportunity to construe and apply the ap-
propriate Virginia statute.2 The husband of the beneficiary applied
for and was issued a policy of insurance on his life. When the insured
died, his wife, as beneficiary, brought an action on the policy. The
company admitted issuance of the policy but denied that it was
effective on the ground that it- was obtained by fraud, claiming that
the insured procured the policy by intentionally making false and
fraudulent answers as to his health in his written application.3 The
company contended that if the questions had been answered truthfully,
the policy would never have been issued.4
The court held that the statute was remedial and that it was en-
acted solely for the protection of the insured.5 By stating what shall
constitute the contract between the parties, the act was held to have
eliminated any defenses available to an insurer who has not fully com-
plied with the law.6
Under similar legislation the majority of courts have adopted a
contrary view to that of the Supreme Court of Appeals. They have
held that while an unattached application is not considered a part
of the contract of insurance and is not admissible as evidence thereof,
it is nevertheless admissible to show fraud in the procurement.7 The
12oi Va. 855, 114 S.E.2d 595 (ig6o).
Wa. Code Ann. § 38.1-393 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
2oi Va. at 855, 114 S.E.2d at 595 (1960).
'Ibid.
5Id. at 857, 114 S.E.2d at 596 (ig6o).
6Id. at 86o-6i, 114 S.E.2d at 599 (196o).
7Carrigan v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n, 26 Fed. 230, (E.D. Pa. 1884); Empire
Life Ins. Co. v. Gee, 17t Ala. 435,55 So. 166 (1911); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, i66
Ala. 159, 51 So. 877 (19o9); Coutch v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 34 Ga. 593, 130
S.E. 596 (1925); Johnson v. American Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 134 Ga. 8oo, 68 S.E. 731
(191o); Holden v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 191 Mass. 153, 77 N.E. 3o9
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important distinction, recognized by the majority of courts, is that
breach of warranty is based on the terms of the contract while fraud
in the procurement is not.8 Breach of warranty assumes an existing
contract while fraud questions whether or not there has been a crea-
tion or formulation of a contract in the first place.9 In the case of
Johnson v. American Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,10 the Georgia Supreme Court
made this differentiation, stating that:
"The legistative enactment, which declares that, under certain
circumstances, an application for insurance shall not be con-
sidered a part of the policy or contract between the parties,
does not prohibit one of such parties from showing that, what-
ever the contract was, it was procured by the fraud of the
other.""'
Due to the serious consequences of proof of fraud-complete nulli-
fication of a transaction between two parties-courts have been reluct-
ant to place limitations upon the ways by which fraud can be proved.12
At common law fraud was always a proper ground for the avoidance
of a contract.13 Even where the majority rule is not followed as to the
admissibility of an application to show fraudulent procurement, it is.
recognized, as to fraud generally, that any statutory provision limit-
(i9o6); Brunjes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 91 N.J.L. 296, 102 Atl. 693 (Ct. Err.
8: App. 1917); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Niland, iii N.J. Eq. 347, 162 Atl.
605 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); Continental Gas Co. v. Owen, 38o Okla. 107, 131 Pac. 1084
1913); Lindsey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1o Tenn. App. 293 (1929); First Texas
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 50 S.W..od io9i (Tex. Com. App. 1932): Bowyer v.
Continental Cas. Co., 72 W Va. 333, 78 S.E. iooo (1913).
"Courts are in unanimous agreement that the claim of breach of warranty, as
distinguished from the claim of fraudulent procurement of an insurance policy, can-
not be relied on when a statutory requirement that the application be made a part
of the contract or that the policy contain the whole contract has not been complied
with. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 166 Ala. 159, 51 So. 877 (19o9); Couch v. National
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 34 Ga. 593, 130 S.E. 596 (1925); Arnold v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 131 Tenn. 720, 177 S.W 78 (1915); Bowyer v. Continental Cas. Co., 72 W Va.
333, 78 S.E. iooo (1913). See also, Annot., 93 A.L.R. 374 (1934) and 29 Am. Jur.
Insurance § 281 (196o).
9Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitler, 172 F.2d 631 (7 th Cir. 1949); Hayes v.
Durham Life Ins. Co., 198 Va. 670, 96 S.E.2d 109 (1957); Wheelock v. Clark, 21 Wyo.
300, 131 Pac. 35 (1913)- "The application itself is not the contract but is a mere
offer or proposal for a contract of insurance. It is merely a step in the creation of the
insurance contract." 29 Am. Jur. Insurance § 197 (196o). "An action for fraud is
not an action on a contract but is an action for inducing the execution of the con-
tract " 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 68 (1943).
'0134 Ga. 8oo, 68 S.E. 731 (191o).
uid. at 732.
uEmpire Life Ins. Co. v. Gee, 171 Ala. 435, 55 So. 166, 168 (1911); Holden v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 191 Mass. 153, 77 N.E. 309 (19o6).
1New York Life Ins. Co. v. Buchberg, 249 Mich. 317, 228 N.V. 770, 772 (193o),
admitting an unattached application for reinstatement of a policy of life insurance.
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ing or destroying the right to prove fraud is in derogation of the
common law.'4 Any such provision should, therefore, not be extended
beyond its plain meaning.15 This does not mean that parties to writ-
ten agreements have been given an easy means of avoiding their obli-
gations, nor that the burden of proving fraud is less than at common
law. The title of the applicable section of the Virginia statute reads
"Policy constitutes entire contract....,,16 It would thus seem clear
that the statute is to apply only to what shall constitute a contract
and the terms thereof, and not to whether or not a contract exists to
begin with.
While a statute such as that of Virginia protects the insured by
making the entire contract available to him, it does not state that
the application has no value as evidence to show the fraudulent pro-
curement of the policy. In the absence of mandatory language to that
effect the unattached application should be admissible to show fraud.'
7
This seems to be a common sense construction 8 and false statements,
intentionally made in an application, inducing the issuance of a policy
are certainly none the less false because not attached to the policy.' 9
It is not clear from the statute itself that, as the court said in the
Donatt case, the intent of the General Assembly was to protect the in-
sured alone and not the insurer as well.20 No documents or reports of
the formulating committee are available from which to determine the
intent of the General Assembly.21 It would not seem unreasonable,
however, to assume that the intent was to protect both parties, since
the act provides for both parties to have a copy of the entire contract. 22
'"Id. at 772.
1I5 bid.
"Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-393 (Repl. Vol. 1953). (Emphasis added.)
1-Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Gee, 171 Ala. 435, 55 So. 166, 168 (i911).
2nCarrigan v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n, 26 Fed. 230, 232 (E.D. Pa. 1884): Brun-
jes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 91 N.J.L. 296, 1o2 Atd. 693 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917);
First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 50 S.W.2d iogi (Tex. Com. App. 1932).
"Bowver v. Continental Cas. CO., 72 W. Va. 333, 78 S.E. woo (1913); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America v. Niland, iii N.J. Eq. 347, 162 Atl. 6o5 (Ct. Err. & App.
1932).
2°The statute does not specifically state, nor even imply, that either of the two
parties is to be protected more than the other.
'Letter from John B. Boatwright, Jr., Director Division of Statutory Research
and Drafting of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to Raymond R. Robrecht, Jr.,
October 28, ig6o.
"'The intent appears to be to protect both parties, so that the application
which gives inception to the policy will be included as a part thereof." Ibid.
While the letter indicates that both parties are meant to be protected at the
inception of the contract, it has been shown that the statute seems to have only a
contractual application and it does not spell out any reason for the application
being attached other than so as to form a part of the contract.
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Interpreting the statute to allow proof of fraud, by an unattached
application, does not mean that the insured should not be protected,
but this protection is provided by other means. The insured is pro-
tected in that an application not attached to the policy cannot be
used to contradict the terms of the policy. Additional protection is
given the insured by the incontestability clause, required in each policy
of insurance by the section of the Virginia Code immediately follow-
ing the section under discussion.23 This section provides that after
two years from the date of issuance the policy is incontestable by
either party.2 4 Certainly, this should be ample protection against the
sudden cancellation of a policy by the insurer after one has paid
premiums over a long period of time. By this clause the insured is
also protected against the company's waiting until an action is brought
on the policy to make known for the first time any representational
errors made by the insured in his application. Thus, under ordinary
circumstances, the insured is well protected against being deprived of
his rights under the policy. However, it has been shown that fraud is
the exception to ordinary circumstances since it deals with the exis-
tence and not the construction of the policy. To assume that a con-
tract exists and to say that after a certain period it shall be incon-
testable is a different matter from saying that no contract existed in
the first place. That the defense of fraudulent procurement is not
precluded by the incontestability clause was pointed out in Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America v. Niland, 5 where the court stated that in the
usual situation such a clause has been upheld as both a legal and
equitable safeguard. However, the court held that persons named as
beneficiaries of one who procured an insurance policy by intentional
fraud would have little equity as against the insurer even though the
period of contestability had passed. 26
It would have been reasonable for the court in the Donatz case to
have adopted the majority view and admitted the unattached appli-
cation as evidence of fraud in the procurement. The Virginia statute
appears to apply only to the contract itself and not to the use of an
unattached application to prove fraud. In view of this, and of the con-
sequences of proving fraud, it would seem that the statute should not
be applied beyond its actual scope so as to deprive one of the right
to prove fraud. The insured is sufficiently protected, under the statute
2nVa. Code Ann. § 38.1-394 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
"In each such policy there shall be a provision that the policy shall be incon-
testable after it has been in force for a period of two years from its date Ibid.
-i i N.J. Eq. 347, 162 At. 6o5 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
21d. at 607.
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